This paper proposes a voting scheme that coalesces many features of an efficient e-voting scheme like receipt-freeness, uncoercibility, E2E verifiable and write-in ballot. Some of the previous schemes in the past literatures provide most of these features at the cost of increased running time. This paper proposes a simple and efficient voting scheme that is coercion resistant and E2E verifiable. It also has the write-in property. Our protocol addresses some of the major drawbacks of previous popular voting schemes to make the proposed scheme applicable for any kind of real time elections.
Introduction
Electronic voting promises a convenient and efficient facility for recording and tallying votes. Lot of literatures has been developed on electronic voting over the last two decades. Several of these schemes concentrate mainly on security of electronic voting (Sampigethaya & Poovendran, 2006) The use of Internet and incorrect implementations of the schemes has resulted in many security violations. This gives a scope for lot of rework in many of the schemes. The desirable features of an efficient e-voting scheme includes receipt-freeness, uncoercibility and write-in ballot. An election protocol is said to be coercion-resistant if a voter V cannot prove to a potential coercer C that the voter V voted in a particular way. The write-in ballots allow voters to choose their own ballots. Some of the popular voting schemes satisfy most of these requirements at the cost of increased running time. This paper proposes a voting scheme with reduced running time, satisfying most of the desirable features of the existing write-in and coercion resistant voting scheme.
Related Work
One of the main requirements of a voting protocol is to ensure the privacy of a voter. Receipt-freeness, a stronger notion of privacy, restricts a voter to show others how he has voted. The first receipt-free protocol appeared in (Benaloh, J. & Tuinstra, D., 1994) . Naturally receipt-freeness reduces vote buying and selling. Coercion resistant protocols, introduced by (Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson, 2005) guarantees that any powerful adversary cannot be convinced on the voting pattern even with the help of the voter. A drawback of this scheme is the overhead for tallying by the authorities is quadratic with the number of voters. Processing V votes by N voters requires O (NV) steps for whole verification, which needs a minimum of N 2 steps. This makes the scheme is practicable only for small elections. Moreover, this scheme does not discuss the possibility of write-in ballots also. (Kiayias & Yung 2004) proposed a vector ballot scheme, which allows write-in ballots. But this scheme does not have coercion resistance feature. (Acquisti, 2004) proposed a voting scheme, which guarantees receipt-freeness, uncoercibility and write-in ballot. But for validating and tallying of votes, this scheme requires all possible ballots for each credential. So the time complexity of this scheme is even much higher than that of the scheme proposed by (Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson, 2005) and hence is practicable only for small elections.
In recent years, a new class of voting scheme has been proposed in which the voter will be issued with a receipt after interaction with the voting system. This receipt can be used to check with a set of encrypted receipts published by the authority in the Bulletin Board. Also these receipts can be used by the voter to verify whether the vote cast by him is counted in the final tally. But it can't be used to prove the manner in which he/she cast the vote. This type of voting scheme is called end-to-end or E2E voting system . Many of the E2E voting schemes like Punch scan (Popoveniuc, S. & Hosp, B., 2006) , Scratch & Vote (Adida, B. & Rivest, R., 2006) and Three-ballot (Rivest, R., 2006) are paper based voting schemes. But even in such paper based voting schemes, coercion resistance is the most desirable feature to make a secure voting scheme.
So this paper proposes a simple and practical voting scheme that is both E2E verifiable and coercion resistant. It also has the write-in property (provision for casting the vote in favor of a pseudo-candidate). Since this scheme uses the Paillier crypto system (Pascal Paillier, 1999) , the tallying of votes can also be done easily. Our protocol also addresses some of the major drawbacks of (Kiayias & Yung, 2004) , (Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson, 2005) and (Acquisti, 2004) . The proposed scheme is similar to (Acquisti, 2004) , but it takes less amount of time to perform the entire cross checks and elimination of duplications.
Comparison with Acquisti's Scheme
In Acquisti's scheme, the search space contains the entire vote cast, which is a variable. A voter can vote any number of votes, but only the last cast vote can be taken for tally. So the number of votes cast may become very large and thus the search space may also be huge. Whereas in the proposed scheme, search space contains only the issued credentials, which is fixed and only the encrypted credentials are compared for validation. In Acquisti's scheme, each valid credential is operated with all ballots and the resulting products are compared with each of the vote cast. But in the proposed scheme, a search tree is constructed for the issued credentials before the voting process, which would make the validation and tallying simple. The construction of such a tree is not possible in Acquisti's scheme, because the search space varies dynamically. Also in Acquisti's scheme, validation and tallying phase is very complex as compared to the proposed scheme. Another variation is that in the former scheme, the selection of last cast vote is done separately from the validation phase whereas in the proposed scheme it is done along with the validation phase. Other benefits of the proposed scheme over Acquisti's scheme are: The proposed scheme needs only O (n log n) steps to perform the entire verification and elimination of duplications, but in Acquisti's scheme, it will be in the order of O (n 3 ). In the proposed scheme, the elimination of duplicate votes and validation of credentials can be performed in a single step, which will further reduce the running time. Since this scheme uses homomorphic encryption, the tallying time also gets reduced. Moreover, this scheme allows multiple casting so that a coerced voter gets a chance to cast an intended vote.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 'Section 2' describes the voting model and the voting lifecycle. 'Section 3' presents the voting protocol. 'Section 4' evaluates the performance of the proposed scheme and 'Section 5' concludes the paper. cryptographic primitives. During the registration phase, each responsible authority creates the shares of voting credential for each eligible voter. Each authority posts these credential shares on the Bulletin Board (BB), encrypted with both authority's and voter's public key. These shares will be sent to the intended voters (along with the proof) and also to the validator (after proper encryption). The authority also publishes the candidate slate on the BB. The validator multiplies the shares of the encrypted credential and creates the BST with the search key as the credential encrypted with authority's public key.
Each voter multiplies the decrypted shares which he has obtained from the BB, using the homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem (Pascal Paillier, 1999) with his private key. The voter sends the resulting credential (encrypted with authority's public key) along with the candidate choice (encrypted with tallier's public key) to the BB. At the end of the voting phase, the tallier mixes all ciphertext posted by the eligible voters, and the validator stores the verified ballots in the BST. The tallier is responsible for tallying the votes stored in the BST.
The Voting Protocol
Setup: Two sets of Paillier public/private key pairs are generated for the authority in a reliable manner as in (Acquisti, 2004 After proper encryption, all these ballot shares will be published in the specific location of the BB and would also be sent to each voter with the verification proof (just like the credential shares).
Registration: Each A j uses a random number generator to schedule the generation of credential shares for voters. The generated random number i is given to each A j to generate the credential share for voter V i . The generated share will be posted on the BB in the area reserved for voter V i . The credential share which is generated in random order is then issued to the validator in the same order so that the validator cannot connect the credentials with the voter.
The Authority A j generates the string σ ij for voter V i that serves as the credential of voter V i . More details about the creation of credential is given in (Brands, 2002) . For each σ ij it creates, A j encrypts σ ij using the public key PK Ac with proper secret randomization; then signs the ciphertext with the secret key SK j Ac and publishes it on the designated location of the BB for the shares of credential of voter V i . This data is
(1) The authority A j again encrypts σ ij using PK Av and attaches a verifier proof PV i to prove that E(σ ij ) PK Av and E(σ ij ) PK Ac are ciphertexts of σ ij . The resulting message is encrypted with V i 's public key, PK Vi and sent to the space allocated for V i in the BB by the authority. This data is
Once again, the each authority A j encrypts σ ij using PK Av without attaching any verifier proof. This ciphertext is again encrypted with the validator's public key PK VD and is sent to the validator through a mixnet (Lee, B., Boyd, C., Dawson, E., Kim, K., Yang, J. & Yoo, S., 2003). This data is
E ( E( σ ij ) PK
Av ) PK VD (3) Since the credential shares are generated in random order by each authority A j and the Validator receives them in the generated order, so, even with the complete set of encrypted credentials, mapping between a voter and his/her credential will not be feasible for the validator. Another thing is, since the authorities send the encrypted credential shares through mixnets, the validator will not be able to find out which authority is responsible for what credential share.
The validator calculates the respective credential for each voter by multiplying the credential shares as in (4).
(4)
The validator then creates a BST as in Algorithm 1 with the encrypted credential as the search key for a node. Tree Node Structure: A node in the BST has the following data stored: Encrypted Credential(EC), Time Stamp(TS), Encrypted Ballot(EB), write-in ballot bit (WBB) and pointers to left and right nodes as shown in Figure 1 .
Additional information like time stamp, encrypted ballot and write-in ballot bit will set filled up at the time of voting.
Voting: A voter receives the credential share from the BB and verifies the designated proof PV i . On successful verification, he/she multiplies together the shares E (σ ij ) PK Av as shown in (4). If the voter k selects a candidate B k from the BB (approved by the Authority), then without setting the write-in ballot bit he/she encrypts the vote B k with the public key PK T of the tallier. Otherwise, he/she sets the write-in ballot bit and casts his/her vote in favor of his/her own candidate using PK T . A voter V i thus generates the vote as
(E(E (B k ) PK T),TS,WBB, (E (σ i ) PK Av ) PK VD (5)
In (5), the first part is the ciphertext on the candidate choice of the voter, and the last part is the ciphertext on the credential of the voter. The voter wraps the resulting ciphertext with the public key PK VD of the validator. The encryption using Paillier public Key (Pascal Paillier, 1999) PK T of tallier needs to be semantically secure for preventing passive attacks. The resulting ciphertext is posted on the BB by the voter.
Tallying:
To tally the ballots posted on BB, the tallier performs the following tasks:
 Mixing the ballots: To eliminate the correlation between the voter and his vote, a mixing of the ballots using mixnet (Lee, B., Boyd, C., Dawson, E., Kim, K., Yang J. & Yoo S., 2003) is carried out by the tallier and then is given to the validator.  Eliminating duplicates and checking credentials: After the correct decryption of each vote, the validator performs a search in the BST for the encrypted credential of the voter. A hit in the BST indicates a valid credential (otherwise the vote is discarded). For a hit, depends upon the time stamp (only the last cast vote), store the encrypted ballot, the time stamp of the vote and write-in ballot bit in the corresponding nod of the tree. If it is not the last cast vote, then also discard it. Before tallying the time stamp of each ballot is removed to avoid identification of ballots. Algorithm 2 performs the elimination of duplication and validation of credentials.  Tallying: The tallier multiplies all ballots in BST nodes whose write-in ballot bit is not set and decrypts the sum. The tallier also decrypts all encrypted ballots in the tree nodes whose bit is set since write-in ballots need to be read individually. By combining the output of the above two steps, the tallier generates the final result. Threshold decryption is applied by sharing the secret key among the Talliers. Each tallier runs the decryption algorithm and produces a partial decryption of E (B k ) PK T, providing a proof of validity for the partial decryption. The tallier can then produce the decryption of ciphertext E (B k ) PK T, if enough PK partial decryptions (t or more) are valid.
Performance Evaluation

Robustness/Collusion
Each authority sends the encrypted credential shares to each voter on BB along with a non-interactive zero knowledge proof for the authenticity of the credential. This allows the voters to identify malicious authorities. Since the credential is generated in a distributed manner, only if all the authorities have colluded, cheating the election process is possible (We have every reason to believe that there will be at least one honest authority). Since all vital data is stored on the BB, any malicious activity from the validator can be detected even if the validator and the tallier collude.
Universal verifiability
Since the list of cast ballots is published on the BB, a voter can verify whether his/her vote is taken into account or not. So the scheme is E2E verifiable. All the transactions made by the validator and all the outputs of mixing and tallying stages are stored on the BB. Since, the whole communication involved during the protocol execution is stored on the BB, the scheme remains as universally verifiable.
Correctness
Even though a voter is allowed multiple casting, only the last choice is stored in the BST. Duplicates are eliminated and hence one ballot is counted exactly once during tallying. Moreover, the validator cannot add or eliminate any vote since all functions are publicly verified.
Coercion Resistance and Receipt Freeness
This scheme gains coercion resistance by allowing the attacker to cast a vote by providing a fake credential with non-interactive zero knowledge proof for the credential validity. During the voting stage, a voter does not get any indication about the validity of his/her credentials, and the credentials are validated only during the tallying phase. Before the validation of credentials, a mixing of ballots is performed and the relation between a voter and the ballot is practically removed. See (Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson, 2005) for a rigorous proof.
Since this scheme supports multiple casting, the coerced voter can cast his choice during any instance of voting. However, only the last cast ballot is counted for the election result. Moreover, the coercer cannot distinguish the candidate choice of the voter, which is counted for the final tally. Also, the voter cannot be uniquely identified using the time stamp as it is removed from the ballot during the tallying stage. As the voter can furnish fake credential to the adversary, the coercer is unable to identify the candidate choice of the voter and hence the scheme is free from "randomization attack" by Schoenmakers as given in (Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson, 2005) .
Complexity Analysis
The (n) ). The addition of write-in property will not cause any additional running time, as the tallying can be completed with a single traversal of the BST. So the reduced complexity makes this scheme applicable to any real time elections.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present an electronic voting scheme that achieves privacy, uncoercibility, receipt-freeness and write-in property with less running time compared to the popular coercion resistant receipt-free voting schemes. The proposed scheme allows different types of ballots that include yes/no, multi-candidate, 1 out of t choices, as well as write-in ballots. The protocol also allows flexible ballot formats to be used for receipt-freeness and universal verifiability. Thus, the scheme offers a simple and secure method for any generic real time electronic voting. Introduction of methods to reduce the running time further for processing n votes, maintaining the security is suggested as a topic for further research. 
